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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals properly affirm the

Industrial Commission's final decision by holding that

M

[t]he

Industrial Commission did not act unreasonably nor abuse its
discretion by selecting the September 24, 1984, date for
commencement of benefits given the progressive nature of
plaintiff's disability and the difficulty of determining the
exact date of maturation of [plaintiff's] disability?"
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULES
The Statute and Rules relevant to a determination of the
present case are:

(1) Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (Supp. 1986);

and (2) Rules 42-43, Rules of Utah Supreme Court, 56 Utah Adv.
Rep. 38 (1987) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
h.

Nature Of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition By the Court of Appeals

This case arises under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act.
Charles G. Oman ("Oman") sustained an industrial accident
on May 12, 1975.

(R. at 2.)

On March 21, 1977, a Compensation Agreement was made by
Oman and approved by the Industrial Commission under which Oman

-1-

received temporary total disability and permanent partial
disability compensation.

(R. at 24.)

After filing a claim on

September 15, 1977, Oman received additional compensation.
(R. at 27.)
Nearly five years later in August 1982, Oman filed an
Application for Hearing claiming additional temporary total and
permanent partial disability compensation.

Oman also claimed,

for the first time, permanent total disability.

(R. at 37.)

Defendants Peabody Coal Company and Old Republic Insurance
Company ("Peabody Coal") denied the claims and asserted a
statute of limitation defense.

(R. at 38-39.)

At the first hearing on September 24, 1984, Administrative
Law Judge Richard G. Sumsion found M[T]hat [Oman] was by no
means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a result of
the industrial accident

. . . ," and that Oman's claims for

additional compensation were barred by statutes of limitation.
(R. at 411-413.)
After placement with the Utah Division of Rehabilitation
Services, a second hearing was held on November 14, 1985.
(R. at 456-457.)

On December 11, 1985, Judge Sumsion entered a

supplemental Order, finding that Oman did not become
permanently and totally disabled until.July 31, 1985.
564.)

(R. at

Judge Sumsion also found that Peabody Coal was not

liable for any further compensation benefits because Oman did

not become permanently and totally disabled until more than ten
years after the accident which was well beyond the six year
statutory period of employer's liability for permanent total
disability.

(R. at 564.)

On Oman's Motion for Review of Judge Sumsion's Order (R. at
568-573), the Industrial Commission affirmed Judge Sumsion's
Order except for the date of permanent total disability.
Instead the Commission used September 24, 1984, which came from
Oman's suggestion of medical confirmation as an alternative
benefit commencement date.
On April 15, 1987, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its
decision upholding the Industrial Commission's factual
determination and selection of September 24, 1984 as the proper
date for commencement of benefits.

A copy of that decision is

attached hereto as addendum "A".
B.

Statement of Facts.

Defendants are dissatisfied with Oman's statement of facts.
1.

Oman was injured on May 12, 1975, when he was cleaning

up after cave-in.
him.

While moving rocks, support timber fell on

(R. at 2, 3, 89.)

Judge Sumsion noted that "the accident

is not questioned, but the extent of injuries sustained as a
result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt."
at 408.)

(R.

2.

Following the accident, Oman continued work, digging

out rock for "better than half a day."

(R. at 90.)

Later Oman

sought medical attention from the Emery Medical Center for
hyperventilation.

No report was made of any back injury.

(R. at 149.)
4.

About two weeks after the accident, Oman saw a

chiropractor for his back.
were found.
5.

No records from this chiropractor

(R. at 94.)

After receiving marriage counseling and other help in

dealing with the May mine accident, (R. at 157-165), Oman
returned to normal work life.
6.

Oman worked at the mine between June 12, 1975 and

April 30, 1976.
7.

(R. at 165.)

(R. at 24.)

Oman did not see a medical doctor about back problems

until May, 1976.

After examination, Dr. N. K. Dean referred

Oman to Dr. Thomas E. Soderberg.

Dr. Soderberg performed a

three-level back fusion in June, 1976.
8.

(R. at 167, 262.)

In November, 1976, Dr. Soderberg recommended further

surgery to determine whether there was a non-union of the
fusion.

Oman refused surgery.

Thereafter, a permanent partial

impairment rating of 25% for the back was given.
9.
entered.

(R. at 168.)

On March 21, 1977, the Compensation Agreement was
(R. at 24.)

10.

In September, 1977, Oman elected to have surgery and

wanted temporary total disability compensation retroactive to
May, 1977.
11.

(R. at 27.)

This was paid.

In December, 1977, surgery was again performed to

re-fuse the levels L-4 to S-l.
12.

(R. at 168, 192.)

Oman continued to receive temporary total disability

compensation through September 7, 1978.
13.

(R. at 38.)

(R. at 33.)

Contrary to Oman's representation that he attempted

unsuccessfully to return to work and that he last worked on
April 22, 1976, on August 21, 1978, Oman applied for a business
license for Kelly's Bar with the State Tax Commission of Utah.
He identified himself as the sole owner.

(R. at 476-478.)

This document was marked and received into evidence as Exhibit
D-20 and is attached hereto as addendum "B."
14.

(R. at 478.)

On September 1, 1978, Dr. Soderberg noted that Oman

was "tending bar" and lifting cases of canned drinks.

Dr.

Soderberg gave Oman clearance to return to work, including
heavy work.

Oman indicated he would continue tending bar.

(R.

at 169.)
15.

In March, 1979, Oman filed, as the owner, a State of

Utah Sales and Use Tax Return for Kelly's Bar.

(R. at 479.)

This document was marked and received into evidence as Exhibit
D-21 and is attached hereto as addendum "C."

(R. at 479.)

16.

In May, 1979, Oman was charged and pled guilty to

permitting gambling at Kelly's Bar.

(R. at 482.)

This

document was marked and received into evidence as Exhibit D-24
and is attached hereto as addendum "D."
17.

(R. at 482.)

In December, 1979, Oman filed, as the owner, another

Sales Tax Return for Kelly's Bar.

(R. at 480)

This document

was marked and received into evidence as Exhibit D-22 and is
attached hereto as addendum "E."
18.

(R. at 480)

On his 1979 Federal and Utah income tax returns, Oman

reported that he owned and was self-employed at Kelly's Bar
while his wife worked as a receptionist for Emery Medical
Clinic.

Oman reported a net profit from this business and paid

self-employment tax for himself.
19.

(R. at 349, 356.)

On his 1980 Federal and Utah income tax returns, Oman

reported that he owned and was self-employed at Kelly's Bar
while his wife was a housewife.

He reported a net profit from

his business of $5,197 which is more than he would have
received from disability benefits.

[Disability would have been

computed at the maximum rate of $95.33 per week for 52 weeks
which is $4,957.16.]
20.

(R. at 357-362.)

On his 1981 Federal and Utah income tax returns, Oman

again reported he owned and was self-employed at Kelly's Bar
while his wife was a housewife.

(R. at 363-368.)

21.

In August, 1982, Oman and his wife entered into a

three year Lease Agreement with two year options to renew for
Kelly's Bar.

(R. at 480-482.)

This document was marked as

Exhibit D-23, received into evidence and is attached hereto as
addendum "F."
22.

(R. at 482.)

On his 1982 Federal and Utah income tax returns, Oman

once again reported he owned and was self-employed at Kelly's
Bar while his wife was a housewife.
23.

(R. at 369-374.)

On his 1983 Federal and Utah income tax returns, Oman

again reported he owned and was self-employed at Kelly's Bar
while his wife was a housewife.

Oman again reported a profit

in excess of the maximum rate of disability benefits.

(R. at

375-379.)
24.

In March, 1984, while locking up Kelly's Bar, Oman's

car was stolen.
25.

(R. at 483, 484.)

In April, 1984, Oman purchased a Siroma Draw 80 poker

machine for Kelly's Bar.
was sued.

When Oman failed to pay for it, he

(R. at 485-487.)

Supporting documents were marked

and received as Exhibits D-28 and D-29 and are attached hereto
as addenda MG" and "H."
26.

(R. at 485, 487.)

In September, 1984, Oman made a report to the police

that a vehicle was stolen at Kelly's Bar.

(R. at 484.)

This

document was marked and received into evidence as Exhibit D-27
and is attached hereto as addendum "I. M

(R. at 485.)

27.

On his 1984 Federal and State income tax returns, Oman

reported that he and his wife were self-employed at Kelly's
Bar.

However, he listed himself as the sole owner.

He

reported a net profit of $12,880, which is nearly $8,000 more
than maximum disability benefits.
self-employment tax for himself.
28.

Oman again paid
(R. at 380-387.)

The 1984 tax returns, which are the first to list

Oman's wife as self-employed, were signed in April, 1985.
at 380.)

(R.

Before then, on February 25, 1985, Peabody Coal

notified Oman that they thought he owned and operated Kelly's
Bar and that they felt this would disqualify Oman for permanent
total disability compensation.
29.

(R. at 427, 428.)

In November and December, 1983, Oman received numerous

checks made out to him for Christmas trees.

(R. at 493, 494.)

In November and December, 1984, Oman received checks made out
to him for Christmas trees.

(R. at 492, 493.)

These packets

of checks were marked as Exhibits D-38 and D-37, respectively,
and were received into evidence.

(R. at 493, 494.)

They are

too numerous to include in the addendum.
30.
Rockette.

In 1984 and 1985 Oman owned and raced a horse named El
Sometimes he would travel to watch it race.

Payments for the horse came out of -^he^Kelly's Bar checking
account.

(R. at 495-496)

31.

Oman paid for personal and family living expenses out

of the Kelly's Bar checking account.

Numerous checks were

offered and received into evidence confirming this.
498-499.)
32.

They are too numerous to include in an addendum.

Oman regularly opened Kelly's Bar and was seen there

regularly.
33.

(R. at

(R. at 471, 516-518, 527.)

When the sheriffs office needed to contact Kelly's

Bar, they contacted Oman.

(R. at 512, 513, 517.)

The

Sheriff's office was not even aware that Oman was disabled
until they were contacted by defendants' investigator.

(R. at

516-518.)
34.

In April 1985 Oman reported to Four Corners Community

Health Center that he "is able to do the business managing of
the bar that the couple owns" and that "he is quite innovative
and creative as far as money making ideas."
attached hereto as addendum "J."

These records are

(R. at 460, 461, 487.)

35.

Kelly's Bar was still open as of the last hearing.

36.

The first medical opinion of permanent and total

disability was that of Dr. Robert E. Potts on September 21,
1984, rendered after the application was filed.
37.

(R. at 156.)

The matter was never referred to a medical panel for

an impartial evaluation.
38.

Oman did not claim that his permanent impairment for

his back had changed from the 25% rating given by Dr. Soderberg

in 1976.

(R. at 336.)

However, Oman did claim a 25%

psychiatric impairment arising after March 21, 1977.
336.)

(R. at

None of Oman's doctors who gave him a psychiatric

impairment (Frank Dituri, Jack Tedrow, and Ronald Reuben) were
aware of his business activities.
incapacitated.

(R. at 333-336.)

All thought he was totally
[Dr. Tedrow's opinion was

received as Exhibit A-13 (R. at 462, 465) and Dr. Reuben's
opinion was received as Exhibit A-17 (R. at 463, 465.)]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Oman's Petition for Writ of Certiorari is ill founded for
at least three significant reasons.

First, review by writ of

certiorari is not appropriate in the instant case because
plaintiff has failed to satisfy any justification that this
court considers in granting such a writ.

Second, plaintiff

mischaracterizes the nature of the Utah Court of Appeals'
affirmance of the Industrial Commission's factual
determination.

Plaintiff mistakes the nature of the Court of

Appeal's decision, confusing the purely factual determination
of the instant case with a supposed legal claim.

Finally,

plaintiff improperly raises, for the first time in this
petition, the issue of benef 1t/payments in excess of ^t_h^
statutory maximum of 312 weeks.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SINCE PLAINTIFF FAILS TO SHOW ANY SPECIAL OR
IMPORTANT REASON FOR GRANTING A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI, PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR REVIEW
SHOULD BE DENIED.
Plaintiff seeks review by a writ of certiorari under
subsections (2) and (4) of Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court,asserting that the Court of Appeals decided a
question of state law in conflict with or unsettled by this
Court.1

Even where justification has been demonstrated, this

Court has emphasized that "certiorari is a discretionary
writ."

Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 1981).

This

Court declared that such "discretion must be used sparingly so
as not to undermine . . . limits on the time and manner of
appellate review."

J

Boggess, 635 P.2d at 42.

The pertinent portions of Rule 43 provide that:
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following . . .indicate the character
of reasons that will be considered:. . .(2) When a
panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question
of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict
with a decision of this Court;. . .(4) When the Court
of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been,
but should be, settled by this Court. (Emphasis
added.) Review of Judgments, Orders, and Decrees of
Court of Appeals, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 38-39 (May 4,
1987) .

The function of the Supreme Court is to review Court of
Appeals decisions only where substantial issues of law exist or
serious error has occurred.

See Mast v. Standard Oil Co. of

California, 140 Ariz. 1, 680 P.2d 137, 138 (1984).

Faced with

a similar Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Oregon Supreme
Court stated in 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Board of County
Commissioners, Etc., 584 P.2d 1371, 1372 (Ore. 1978) that:
[t]he function of this Supreme Court is no longer to
afford every losing litigant a forum to review errors
said to have been committed at trial or in an administrative hearing. That function is now placed in the
Court of Appeals. Similarly, a party asserting that
the Court of Appeals, in turn, has erred cannot for
that reason alone expect further review in this
Court. The process must stop somewhere, and for most
purposes this is at the first level of appeal.
(Emphasis added.)
Much like this Court, Oregon has not set forth a set of
criteria entitling a petitioner to review as of right, but
rather, has required a petitioner to "present concrete reasons
why the importance of an issue transcends the importance of the
case to the litigants."

Id., at 1373.

Oman's petition in the

instant case does not encompass any legal issue which might
"transcend the importance of the case to the litigants", nor
does it "present any concrete reason" for further review.

This

petition is better characterized as a factual issue not likely
to be repeated.

Indeed, Oman himself framed the issues before

the Court of Appeals in terms of the limited standard of review
for factual determinations.

Oman's brief states:

This case presents two issues on appeal from the
Industrial Commission's final Order: first, whether
the Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in failing to commence permanent total
disability benefits on the last day that he was able
to work; • . . . (Emphasis added.)
(Oman's initial brief at 1.)
Accordingly, as discussed in detail below, the Court of
Appeals only reviewed the propriety of the Industrial
Commission's factual determination of when petitioner's
"industrial accident became progressively worse, finally
culminating in total permanent disability."

Oman v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, Case No. 860189-CA at 3 (Utah App. 1987).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Industrial Commission's
Finding of Fact, noting that Oman "did not become permanently
and totally disabled until after the expiration of the initial
six year period."

16.

After review of the Industrial

Commission's factual determinations, the Court of Appeals
properly held that:
The Industrial Commission did not act unreasonably nor
abuse its discretion by selecting the September 24,
1984, date for commencement of benefits given the
progressive nature of plaintiff's disability and the
difficulty of determining the exact date of maturation
of the disability.
Id.

A.

The Oman Decision Did Not Decide an Important Question
of State Law as Yet Undecided by This Court.

Contrary to Oman's contention that the Court of Appeals
decided an important question of state law, as yet, undecided
by this Court, the Court of Appeals specifically based its
opinion on this Court's decision in Spencer v. Industrial
Commission, 87 Utah 336, 40 P.2d 188 (1935) in which this Court
declared:
. • . whether an employee is totally disabled or permanently disabled are ultimate matters to be decided
by the commissioner, as is also the amount and time
compensation may be awarded upon all the evidence.
Id. at 197. See Oman, Case No. 860189-CA at 3.

Therefore, the

Court of Appeals' decision was not a decision creating new law,
but was rather a decision conforming to existing law.
B.

The Oman Decision Did Not Decide a Question of State
Law that Conflicts with a Decision of This Court.

Oman contends that the Court of Appeals decision in this
case conflicts with Brundage v. Granite School District, Case
No- 85000742 (November 10, 1986) for the reason that in
Brundage, the Commission held Mthat the permanent total
disability did not begin until after the applicant stopped
working . . . ." Oman's interpretation of Brundage is also
flawed because Oman ignores the fact that the Commission and
Court of Appeals both agreed with the factual determination

that Oman continued to work after April 22, 1976.

The Court of

Appeals specifically upheld the factual determination that Oman
"was not totally and permanently disabled in 1976" and that he
"did not become permanently and totally disabled until after
the expiration of the initial six year period."

Oman, Case No.

860189-CA at 3.
Oman also argues that Section 35-1-67 (Supp. 1986) and this
Court's decision in Norton v. Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d
1025 (Utah 1986) conflict with the Court of Appeals' decision
herein.

However, the Oman decision does not conflict with

either Section 67 or Norton because:

(1) Oman was not

permanently and totally disabled until after the expiration of
the six year statute of limitations; (2) Oman was found to have
continued working at least until the award of benefits was
made; and (3) Section 67 does not contain any statutory
language requiring benefits to commence at either the date of
injury or the last day of employment.

Because Oman continued

working, and was not "totally invalid" neither Norton nor
Section 67 conflicts with the Court of Appeals decision.

For

this reason, the Court of Appeals was careful to address the
relationship of both Norton and Section 67 to the facts of the
instant case.

- i ^-

POINT II
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI WILL NOT BE GRANTED FOR
AN APPEAL WHICH IS BASED ON A FACTUAL
DISPUTE.
One of the central functions of the writ of certiorari is
"to determine whether the inferior court exceeded its
jurisdiction."
1985).

State v. McAllister, 708 P.2d 239 (Mont.

The writ of certiorari must be preserved for issues of

such great legal importance that review is necessary.

Factual

determinations by the Industrial Commission, as in the instant
case, are not proper subjects of further appellate review.
Thus, this Court's scope of review of factual findings in
Industrial Commission cases is restricted:
The reviewing court's inquiry is whether the
Commission's findings are "arbitrary and capricious"
or "wholly without cause" or contrary to the "one
[inevitable] conclusion from the evidence" or without
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then
should the Commission's findings be displaced.
(Emphasis added.)
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981).
The Court of Appeals already determined that the Commission's
findings were not "unreasonable" and not an abuse of
discretion.

Further review is not only duplicative, but also

unnecessary.
The major premise of Oman's argument on appeal is that he
has not worked since April 22, 1976.

To accept this, one must

ignore the facts. A review of all the facts shows overwhelming
support for the Commission's refusal to award benefits before
September 24, 1984 because of Oman's continuing work history.
In August, 1978, Oman began operating Kelly's Bar.
476-478.)

(R. at

When Dr. Soderberg told him he could go back to work

in September, 1978, Oman was already tending bar and continued
doing so.

(R. at 169.)

Contrary to Oman's denials of

ownership and operation, Oman's sales and income tax records
between 1978 and 1984 show him as the sole proprietor of
Kelly's Bar and self-employed there.
476-480.)

(R. at 349-387,

In 1979, Oman, as the owner, was charged and plead

guilty to permitting gambling at Kelly's Bar.

(R. at 482.)

When crimes occurred at Kelly's Bar, Oman reported them to the
sheriff.

(R. at 481-484.)

Numerous checks deposited into the

Kelly's Bar checking account were made payable to Oman.
488-499.)

(R. at

Oman regularly opened the bar, was seen there

regularly and also closed the bar.
516-518, 527.)

(R. at 471, 483, 484,

When a poker machine was purchased for the bar,

Oman handled the transaction.

(R. at 485-487.)

Oman even paid

self-employment tax on himself (but not for his wife) during
this time.

(R. at 349-387.)

Notwithstanding his denials,

nearly all of this evidence came from documents Oman himself
has signed.

While operating Kelly's Bar, Oman reported for income tax
purposes an average net profit of $4,242.67 per year.
349-387.)

(R. at

When the personal and family expenses which were

paid with money from Kelly's Bar are added to his net profit
(R. at 498, 499, 552.), Oman made more money from Kelly's Bar
than he would have with maximum disability benefits.

Oman did

so well that he engaged in an expensive hobby of owning and
racing a horse.

(R. at 495-496.)

These facts do not take into

account the money Oman earned from selling Christmas trees.
(R. at 492-494.)

Oman has not sat idly by, dependent on

workmen's compensation benefits.

He has by his own admission

"been quite innovative and creative as far as money making
ideas."

(R. at 460, 461, 487.)

Oman's last day worked was not April 22, 1976.

Oman's

contention that he ". . . never returned to work following the
surgery on June 29, 1976" is not supported except with respect
to mine work.

If anything, Oman has not quit working and

should not receive any benefits at all.

Considering that Oman

owned, operated and profited from Kelly's Bar, it is no wonder
that the Commission did not award permanent total disability
before September 24, 1984.

Moreover, until 1984, there was

absolutely no medical evidence to support Oman's contentions.
Ironically, the date used by the Commission for awarding
benefits to Oman was suggested by Oman himself.

Although

arguing for the April, 1976 date, Oman proposed September 24,
1984 as an alternative date,

(R. at 571.)

To now claim that

the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Commission's
adoption of Oman's own proposed alternative date strains
credulity.

Under any circumstance, this is not a case

involving a decision of state law in conflict with or unsettled
by this Court.

Hence, Oman's petition for writ of certiorari

should be denied.
POINT III
THIS COURT WILL NOT CONSIDER AN ISSUE NOT
RAISED BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that an issue
not raised in the pleadings or at the trial court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.

Insley Mfg. Corp. v.

Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986);

Bundy v.

Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984).
Oman raises the issue of whether commencement of permanent
total disability payments on some date other than the date of
the applicants industrial accident requires payment of benefits
in excess of the maximum statutory time limit for the first
time in this petition.

(Petition at p. 8.)

circumstances, "[i]t is axiomatic that

Under these

. . . claims not

raised by the parties . . . cannot be considered for the first
time on appeal."
1983) .

Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah

CONCLUSION
The determination of whether an employee is totally
disabled or permanently disabled is a factual matter which must
be ultimately decided by the Industrial Commission.

Because

each case is unique, the Industrial Commission must exercise
its discretion in making such factually governed decisions.

In

the instant case, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the
Commission "did not act unreasonably nor abuse its discretion"
in determining the factual issue that petitioner did not become
totally disabled until years after his industrial injury.
Thus, the petition fails to demonstrate any legal decision
by the Court of Appeals which either creates new law, conflicts
with current law, or necessitates a decision by this Court.
For these reasons, Oman's petition should be denied.
DATED this ^Otf\day

of June, 1987.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

CNRY
'LARRY <£. LAYC&CK
Attorneys for Defendants
Peabody Coal Company and Old
Republic Insurance Company

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^ & M

day of June, 1987, four

copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendants Peabody Coal
Company and Old Republic Insurance Company were mailed to the
following counsel:
Industrial Commission of Utah
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
Second Injury Fund
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
Virginius Dabney, Esq.
DABNEY & DABNEY
136 South Main
Suite 412
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals dated April 15,
1987
Exhibit D-20, Application For License to Engage in
Business
Exhibit D-21, Sale and Use Tax Return, March 29, 1979
Exhibit D-24, 1979 Conviction for permitting gambling at
Kelly's Bar
Exhibit D-22, Sales and Use Tax Return, December 2, 1979
Exhibit D-23, Lease Agreement
Exhibit D-28, Receipt for purchase of poker machine
Exhibit D-29, Answer to Complaint
Exhibit D-27, Crimes Against Property Report, September
29, 1984
Addition to Exhibit A-l, Initial Client Assessment of
Four Corners Mental Health Clinic
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67

-22-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

Charles G. Oman,

A

Plaintiff,
v.

OPINION

Industrial Commission of Utah,
Peabody Coal Company, Old
Republic Insurance Company and
Second Injury Fund,

Case No. 860189-CA

FILED

Defendants.
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood and Bench.

APR 151987
Timothy M. Shea
Cier* of me Court
Utah Court of Appeals

GREENWOOD, Judge:
Plaintiff seeks modification of an order by the
Industrial Commission awarding him permanent total disability
benefits. The benefits were to commence as of September 24,
1984, the date permanent total disability was first medically
confirmed. Plaintiff urges benefits should commence from
either the day of the industrial accident (May 12, 1975) or the
day after he last worked for the employer (April.22, 1976),
whichever is later. Under that theory benefits would commence
as of April 23, 1976. Plaintiff also seeks payment of interest
on the benefits, which was denied by the Industrial Commission.
Plaintiff was injured inajniiig^caye-in on May 12, 1975
in Huntington, Utah, while wp*lcing for peabody Coal Company
("Peabody"). He was treated orthoped^eally for back problems
and also received treatment s£^r dejxeession. He returned
to work on June 15, 1975, but continued to receive medical
treatment. On June 29, 1976, a three level fusion operation
was performed on plaintiff, and in December, 1977, further
surgery occurred, re-fusing plaintiffs back. Plaintiff was
awarded compensation for a 25% permanent partial impairment of
the whole body for his back problems on March 21, 1977.
On June 11, 1982 plaintiff applied for a permanent total
disability award because of psychiatric impairment.
Plaintiffs total disability was confirmed by a letter dated

ADDENDUM A.

September».9, 1984, from his physician. The doctor's
confirmation was corroborated by other medical and mental
healtlj professionals. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), in
"accordance-yith Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986), made a
^ tentative finding of permanent total disability and referred
' » '^plaintiff ;tb the Division of Rehabilitative Services for
:-. evaluation, training and certification. The Division found
-v"^that filayntiff could not be rehabilitated for employment. The
^ALiCfiofrered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order
providing plaintiff with benefits from July 21, 1985, the date
of certification by the Division of Rehabilitation. No
interest on unpaid benefits was awarded. Plaintiff then filed
a Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Review challenging the
commencement date of benefits and failure to order payment of
interest. In response the Industrial Commission denied payment
of interest but changed the benefit commencement date to
September 24, 1934, the first d?te of medical confirmation.
Plaintiff asks this Court to rule that benefits should
commence from April 23, 1976, the day after plaintiff's last
day of work for Peabody. Plaintiff cites Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-64 (1986) as mandating commencement of workers'
compensation no later than three days after the injury.
However, that section deals with total temporary disability
rather than total permanent disability as in this case. Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986) also uses "at the time of injurylanguage to establish benefits, but only in conjunction with
wages at the time of injury. There is no statutory language
requiring benefits to commence at either the date of injury or
the last day of employment, whichever occurs later. Therefore,
plaintiff's argument is without merit. Thus, this Court must
determine if the Commission's order was supported by
substantial evidence and was a reasonable exercise of the
Commission's discretion. Norton v. Indust. Commission. 728
P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986); Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet
Management/ 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986); Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Monfredi. 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981).
In this instance, while the accident causing the initial
injury occurred in 1975, it was not until years later that the
injury developed to a point of total disability. The ALJ
considered evidence that plaintiff had operated a business and
received income between 197 6 (when he stopped working for
Peabody) and 1984. The ALJ's findings state that "[a]11 of the
evidence presented by the defendants was convincing in showing
the [plaintiff] is far from being totally invalid." Benefits
were awarded nonetheless, consistent with the standard referred
to in Norton. 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986). In Norton, the Court
stated that a worker may receive benefits who is not completely
incapacitated but is sufficiently handicapped so "that he will
not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor
market." Norton. 728 P.2d at 1027. Plaintiff was not totally
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and permanently disabled in 1976. His psychiatric problems,
which emanated from the 1975 industrial accident, became
progressively worse, finally culminating in total permanent
disability. As found by the ALJ, •[plaintiff] did not become
permanently and totally disabled until after the expiration of
the initial six year period." The Industrial Commission did
not act unreasonably nor abuse its discretion by selecting the
September 24, 1984, date for commencement of benefits given th
progressive nature of plaintiff1s disability and the difficult
of determining the exact date of maturation of the disability.
A possible gap between full development of the disability and
payment of benefits will not justify reversal. Booms v. Rapp
720 P.2d 1636 (Utah 1986). We concur in the language of
Spencer v, InflUStt Commission/ 87 Utah 336 40 P.2d 188 (1935):
...whether an employee is totally disabled
or permanently disabled are ultimate matters
to be decided by the commissioner, as is also
the amount and time compensation may be
awarded upon all the evidence. Id. at 197.
It is within the sound discretion of the Industrial
Commission to determine the commencement date of benefits for
total permanent disability so long as the determination is
supported by substantial evidence and not patently
unreasonable. Substantial evidence existed in this case for
commencing benefits as of the first date of medical
confirmation of permanent total disability.
Plaintiff also appeals from the Industrial Commission's
denial of interest on unpaid benefits. Plaintiff relies on
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (1986) which states:
Awards made by the Industrial Commission
shall include interest at the rate of 8%
per annum from the date when each benefit
payment would have otherwise become due
and payable.
In Marshall v. Industrial Commission. 704 P.2d 581 (Utah
1985) the Utah Supreme Court held that this statute must be
retroactively applied to accrued or pending actions because its
intent is remedial. The case before us clearly falls within
the statutory language and pursuant to Marshall enactment of
the statute subsequent to the injury or disability is

860189-CA
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irrelevant* Plaintiff is entitled to payment of accrued
interest on all unpaid benefits commencing from September 24,
1984.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

R. W. Garff/ Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

No costs awarded.
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This lease agreement rade and entered into this 1st day of August, 19i:, t\
and between Paul B. Leonard & Violet Leonard, husband 6 wife, & Robert B. Leonard
& Golda Leonard, husband & wife, Castle Dale, Emery County, State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as Lessors and Charles Oman & Ilene Oman, Castle Dale, Emery
County, State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as Lessee,
WITNESSETH
1.

DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY LEASED:

That the Lessor does by these presents

lease to the Lessee the following described real and personal property, to occupy
and use for business purposes, to-wit:
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of Lot 4, Block 11,
Castle Dale Townsite Survey, thence East 12 feet; thence
South 6.5 rods; thence West 44.5 feet; thence North 6.5
rods; thence East 32.5 feet to the point of beginning.
COMMONLY known as Kelly's Pool Hall located at 56 East
Main Street, Castle Dale, Utah, together with all
furniture, fixtures and equipment located therein.
2.

TERM OF LEASE:

The term of this lease shall be from August 1, 1962 to

July 31st, 1965, unless terminated by mutual agreement of the parties or otherwise.
Lessee shall have two (2) year option with 20% increase in rent if option excercised
3-

LESSEES COVENANT:
(a) The lessee shall take good care of the property and its fixtures,

and operate the business in a good and businesslike manner; keep the plumbing works,
closets, pipes and fixtures belonging thereto in good repair, and at the end or
other expiration of the term, deliver up the premises in good order and condition,
natural deterioration and damage by fire only excepted.
(b) To pay to the lessor at Castle Dale, Utah, a monthly rental of $850.0C
per month for thirty-six months beginning August 1st, 1982.

Thereafter, the Lessee

shall have an option to lease for another twenty-four months with the rent to be
$1,020.00 per month.

ADDENDUM

F.

(c) The Lessee expressly agrees that the Lessor shall be free from all
liabilities and claims for damages and/or suits for or by reason of injury or
injuries to any person or persons or property of any kind whatsoever, whether the
person or property of Lessee, his agents or employees, or third persons, from any
cause or causes whatsoever while in or upon said premises or any part thereof
during the term of this lease or occasioned by any occupancy or use of said prer.ises
or any activity carried on by Lessee in connection therewith, and Lessee hereby
covenants and agrees to indemnify and save harmless the Lessor from all liabilities,
charges, expenses (including counsel fees) and costs on account of or by reason
of any such injuries, liabilities, claims, suits or losses however occurring or
damages growing out of same.
(d) Lessee shall obtain all necessary licenses and permits from the City,
State, and Federal Governments necessary or required for the operation of the
business herein leased.
(e) Lessee further agrees to pay all utilities, including but not limited
to gas, electricity, water, and sever, from August 1, 1982 to the end of the
lease period, before any said billings become delinquent.
(f) Lessee agrees to hold Lessor harmless for any indebtedness incurred
by the business after August 1, 1982.
(g) Lessee further agrees not to sub-lease or assign this lease to anyone
during the term hereof, except upon the written consent of the Lessor.
(h) Excessive intoxication or failure to keep the business operating with
regular business will terminate this lease.
4.

LESSORS COVENANT:
(a) That the Lessee, paying the rents and performing the covenants herein

contained, shall peaceably and quietly enjoy the said leased premises and shall not
be disturbed by an act of the Lessor or any person claiming under him.

(b) Lessor agrees t

maintain and keep in repair the roof of said buildin

only, all other repairs and maintenance to be the responsibility of Lessee.
5.

It is mutuall) underst

: d and agreed that Lessor shall have the right tc

enter upon the leased premises at all reasonable time to inspect the same.
6.

Upon the termination of this lease for any reason, Lessee agrees to

surrender the leased property in substantially its condition as of the date of this
lease, and Lessor agrees to purchase the Lessee's inventory on hand at cost tc
Lessee.
7.

In the event the Lessors shall sell the leased premises anytime during

the time this lease is in effect, Lessors agree to make the sale subject to this
lease.
8.

This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators,

and assigns of the parties hereto.
IN WITNESS VKERECF, the parties have hereunto set their hands the day and
year first above written.

LESSEES: Cl j ' * Us
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He also took vallium several years ago,
effective with him.

which

seemed

to

be

PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY:
Approximately 10 years ago prior to the mine accident, Mr.
Oman was having some psychiatric problems and was seeino Nells,
Bather.
ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEMS AND ASSETS:
Strengths that the client has include his abilitv to be able
to come in contact and verbalize his feelinqs and another
strength is that he is able to do the business managing of the
Bar that the couple owns, and he is Quite inovative and creative
as f^r as money making ideas.
Weaknesses that the client has include his loss of self
esteem, and loss of being the wage mmmmr of his family, the
duration that this client has experienced in the lack of suDDort
from financial and rehabilitative resourses.
RELEVANT PAST HISTORY:
Charles Oman is a 41 year old Caucasian male, who is coming
into the Center at this time seeking psychiatric treatment. He
indicates that as a result of a mine cave in ten years ago on May
l£th that he has had a broken back with two fusions, experience?*
severe back pain, has been on pain pills that he is not able to
afford so instead ufces alcohol. He experiences muscle soasms and
is unable to walk or sit or sleep for any length of period. He
indicates that he recalls the mining accident Quite often, he
cannot bear to watch mrty movies involving pain or violence, he
has dreams of the cave in, he has a son in law who had a cave in
a year and a half ago and is on disaoility, which relives a lot
of the feelings that Mr. Oman is experiencing at the present
time, also death mnd accidents and some discussions of the coal
mines are upsetting to him. When he wakes up in the morning, he
exoeriences cold sweats and dry heaves.
As a result of the compensation hearing in November, tne
judge
recommended
that he be rmfmrrwtd
in
to
Vocation
Rehabilitation, which he has done over the last few weeks. Mr.
Staley has set up a tutoring program with Mr. Oman as ne is
unable to read. Mr. Oman is terrified that someone will find out
about this and he is V9ry secretive of the tutor coming to his
home. He is also fearful that he won1t do good enough. Mr. Staley
indicated* to Mr. Oman that he would be able to help get his
daughter into tHm T *•*<*• T*eh i* e*i+ i ML*• — — -
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had given the impression to Mr. Oman, that perhaps this coulc not
be done and Mr. Oman is feeling the burden of somehow getting his
©aughter into the Trade Tech College, without him making any
income. Apparently the couple is experiencing great financial
difficulty and have not been able to pay the original lease on
their business and have had to oay a reduced lease. The lease
«mill be up in August at which time they will need to make a
decision whether to keep their business.
Mr. Oman is also exo€»riencing marital conflict with his wife
who is running the Par for him. He indicates that he does not
care for her down there, it is very upsetting to see her
socializing with the wale patrons, she indicates that she tries
not to come on overly aoo€»aling to her clientale, however, this
is a very sensitive subject for them. Mr. Oman manages the
business end of the bar nrid is Quite creative in developing ways
of bringing in parties, groups, etc.
Mr. Oman was born and raised out of state and when he was in
the tenth grade he dropped out of school due to it being so
difficult for him. Apparently his mother was an invalid wno
spent a great deal of time at home, and he stayed at home to care
for nis mother and no one aooarently checked on them. His father
was a coal miner who was gone lengthy hours during the day witn
working in the coal mine and traveling etc.
This is the first marriage for Mr. and Mrs. Oman. The
couolee have three children, one who is married and lives in the
area, a daughter who is 17, and a son who is 6 years old.
MENTAL STATUS:
Mr. Oman is a handsome Caucasian male who looks oldser than
his 41 years, although he attempts to sit still during the
conversation, he needs to get up and walk around due to tne pain
that he is experiencing. His face shows a great deal of strain
and worry. Mr. Oman has difficulty recalling dates and some
experiences that has happened several years ago. He is onenteo
as to time and place.
DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSION:
309.81, Post traumatic stress Disorder, chronic.
The reason that the client has been given this diagnosis is
that he has been involved in a serious mine cave in ten years ago
whicn has left him Disabled. he has recollections of the
accident, he relives his own trauma and experiences as a result
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ago, which has left him disabled. His compensation is Peine)
threatened as well. Mr. Oman will not watch movies that have to
do with pain, death, violence, news of any accidents are very
upsetting to him and even some coal mine discussion is upsettmc
to him. He experiences cold sweats and dry heaves.
Other diagnosis is £96.33,
Melancholia.

Major depression recurrent witn

The reason that the client has teen catagorireds in tnis
area is that he does have a dysphoric mood and has lost interest
in
his
usual
daily activities.
He
experiences
sleeo
difficulties, psychomotor agitation, feelings of worthlessness,
guilt for bringing on the burden that he has to his family, he
indicates
being
more emotional,
and has
difficulty
in
concentration, he also experiences social withdrawal, where ouite
frecuently when transoortation permits he will leave the area for
several hours or a couple of oavs to be alone.
Another diagnosis: 3$$.$2, Generalized Anxiety Disorder.
The reason that the client has also teen
given this
diagnosis is that he has difficulty in relaxing, he has obvious
strained face, he experiences cold sweats, he feels anxious a
great deal of the time, tends to worry and ruminates about past
events, experiences temper outbursts.
Last diagnosis:

205.01, Alcohol abuse continuous.

Mr. Oman has-been utilising alcohol as a means of heloino
him cope with the pain he is experiencing. He does have a history
over the last ten to twelve years of being a heavy drinker, he
had a DUI apparently six years ago, will spend a great deal of
time w down at the bar where his wife works, and is reoorted to
continually drink alcohol there in getting drunk as much as four
times weekly^
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S5-1-67. Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments.—In eases of permanent total disability the employee ahall receive 662 i 7c of his average weekly wages tt
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66**% of the
•tate average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less
than a minimum of $35 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not to exceed 66*3 7c of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. However,
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance
carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation payments for more
than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by the commission of
permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until
such time as the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and
totally disabled, it shall be mandator;' that the industrial commission of
Vtah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-6S (1), not
to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee;
the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally follow the
practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the rehabilitation
of employees having combined injuries. If and when the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the
industrial commission 0/ Utah and in writing that such employee has fully
co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to
rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the employee may not
be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that there be paid to such
employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66'-/3% of his average weekly
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66-/3 7c
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and
not less than a minimum of $35 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and
$5 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not to exceed
66% 7c of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per
week out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-6S (1), for such
period of time beginning with the time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No employee, however,
ahall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails or refuses to co-operate
with the division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein.

ADDENDUM K.

Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 85-1-68 (1) shall
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $50 per week.
Commencing July 1,1974, all persons who were permanently and totally
disabled on or before March 5.1949, and were receiving compensation benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation benefits
from the special fund provided for by section 35*1*68 (1) at a rate sufficient
to bring their weekly benefit to $50 when combined with employer or insurance carrier compensation payments.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the
vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission
of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the
commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be
heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total
disability shall be required in such instances; in ail other cases, howerer,
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent
disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided
in sections 35-1*65, 55-1*66 and this section, including loss of function, in
excess of 662.37c of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week for 312 weeks.
History: X*. 1917, ch. 100, | ? 8 ; C. Z*
1917, 13139; X* 1919. ch. S3, f 1; ft. 8.
1933. 42-1-43; L. 1937, eh. 41, 1 1 ; 1939,
Ch. 51, | 1 ; C. 1943, 42-1-63; X* 1945, eh.
•5, f 1; 1949, eh. 52, S I ; 1951, eh. 55, { 1 ;
Xt55, eh. 57, S i ; 1957, ch. 62, § 1 ; 1959,
Ch. 55, $ 1 ; 1961, eh. 71, S i ; 1963, eh. 49,
1; 1965, eh. SS, § 1 ; 1967, eh 65, § 1 :
969, ch. 66, | 5; 1971, eh. 76, 16; 1973,
Ch. 67, § 4; 1974, ch. 13.$1.
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